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1 Introduction
It is now more than two decades since the Plaza Agreement signed on September 22, 1985 and
the Louvre Accord on February 22, 1987.1 These agreements were signed in order to induce
US dollar depreciation and promote stability in currency markets, respectively. Economists,
policy makers and central bank analysts still lack conclusive evidence on the impact of CBIs on
exchange returns and especially on volatility. The majority of the empirical literature suggests
that unilateral, and even coordinated intervention of two central banks, does not affect exchange
returns and has in most of the cases the opposite outcome on volatility from that expected
(among others see Beine, 2004; Beine et al., 2002; Fatum, 2002; Humpage, 1999; Baillie and
Osterberg, 1997; Bonser-Neal and Tanner, 1996; Catte et al., 1992). That is, interventions
associated with the Louvre Accord appear to have been counterproductive since they led to an
increase in volatility as opposed to the intended decrease.
The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on the impact of official Central Bank
Interventions (CBIs) on exchange rate returns, volatility and correlations of the DM (Euro
after the 1999) and the JPY against the US dollar. This paper adds to the literature of CBIs
in various respects. First, rather than relying only on G3 official CBIs, that is, the Bank of
Japan, the Bundesbank (or the European Central Bank, ECB, after 1999) and the FED on the
DM(EUR)/USD and the JPY/USD markets, as has already been investigated extensively in
the literature, another major Central Bank is included, namely, the Bank of England (BoE).
That is, the impact of the G4 official CBIs is examined. Such investigation will shed some more
light to the argument that coordinated interventions are more powerful than unilateral ones (see
Beine, 2004; Fatum, 2002; Humpage, 1999; Catte et al., 1992).
1The Plaza agreement was signed by the G5 countries, specifically France, West Germany, Japan, USA and
UK, and the Louvre Accord by the G6 countries (Canada, France, West Germany, Japan, USA and UK). Italy
was also an invited member in the Louvre Accord by declined to finalize the agreement.
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Second, the literature has so far not investigated the number of central banks engaged in
intervention. One of the main questions this paper tries to answer is whether the impact on
exchange rate dynamics is more significant when two central banks intervene in coordination
as opposed to three central banks. The approach adopted in this paper explicitly allows the
investigation of the impact of officially announced coordinated interventions of two and three
central banks, since the Bank of England (BoE) intervened several times in coordination with
another two central banks, and which was part of the G6 Louvre Accord (1987). Accounting for
the BoE official interventions might more accurately assess the real impact of officially announced
CBIs in the post-Louvre Accord period. Ideally, we would investigate the impact of officially
announced central bank interventions of all the countries that were involved in the Louvre
Accord. That is, including the Bank of Canada (BoC) and the Bank of France (BoF), in
addition to the Bank of England. However, since this paper examines the impact of officially
announced CBIs, and since neither the BoC nor the BoF officially announce their interventions,
at least for our sample period, they cannot be taken into account in this research.
The ineffective outcome of the G3 CBIs on exchange rate returns and volatility reported in
the empirical studies might be attributed to several factors. One of which might be the omission
of the Bank of England, which intervened several times in under our investigation sample, and
which was part of the G6 Louvre Accord. Other factors include different sample periods and
models used.
Moreover, as the empirical evidence suggests that intervention has been counterproductive,
it raises several issues such as to why Central Banks keep conducting coordinated interventions
when the result is the exact opposite from the expected one. That is, an increase as opposed
to an anticipated decrease in exchange rate volatility. The inclusion of the BoE might provide
more useful information on whether the impact of CBIs is counterproductive per se or is it due
to the omission of other major central banks. Such information are of great importance for
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central banks’ intervention policy decisions.
This paper focuses only the signalling channel through which CBIs might affect exchange rate
dynamics and not the portfolio balance channel, since the empirical literature is not supportive
of the latter.
The key findings are that unilateral CBIs are found to be more successful in influencing
exchange returns than coordinated CBIs, when taking into account the interventions of the
Bank of England. Coordinated CBIs could increase volatility as the number of central banks
intervening in coordination increases. These results have implications for the effectiveness of
central banks’ intervention policy decisions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology
and data. Section 3 presents the empirical results and section 4 concludes.
2 Methodology and Data
The data consists of daily observations of spot exchange rates of the Deutsche mark (Euro after
1999) and the Japanese yen, all against the US dollar, for the period of April 2, 1991 to October
19, 2001, obtained from the Bank of England online database.2
Following previous work on spot exchange rates data, where the spot rates are generally
non-stationary, we focus on daily exchange rate returns defined as:
∆ ln yt = ln yt − ln yt−1 (1)
where yt is the spot exchange rate and ln is the natural logarithm.
The validity of this first logarithmic difference transformations in rendering the underlying
series stationary is confirmed by the results of unit root tests for non-stationarity using the
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test statistic, which fails to reject the null hypothesis of a unit
2In order to make accurate comparisons, we use the same sample as in Beine (2004).
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root in each of the logged spot exchange rates against stationary alternatives but reject that
null when testing the stationarity of the logged first differences.3
The CBI data consists of official interventions of the Federal Reserve (FED), the Bank of
Japan (BoJ), the Bundesbank (BB) (European Central Bank, ECB, after 1999) and the Bank of
England (BoE).4 Specifically, central bank purchases/sales of the Japanese yen and the Deutsche
mark (Euro after 1999) measured in US dollars.
In order to assess the signalling channel, through which CBIs could influence exchange rates
and their volatility, we use dummy variables that take the value of 1 when central banks inter-
vene and 0 otherwise. In addition, we examine the impact of both unilateral and coordinated
interventions of central banks. In the case of unilateral interventions, we use up to four dum-
mies for the CBIs (capturing the impact of the G4 central banks included in our sample) on
the JPY/USD and the DM(EUR)/USD. In the case of coordinated interventions, since each
of the four banks intervened in both the DM(EUR)/USD and the JPY/USD (apart from the
BB(ECB) which intervened only on the DM(EUR)/USD), it seems appropriate to use only two
dummy variables reflecting the coordinated interventions of two central banks and one dummy
for coordinated intervention of three central banks. Table 1 provides a definition of the dummy
variables used.
[Insert Table 1 around here]
As previously mentioned the estimated parameter of coordinated interventions on exchange
rate volatility is found to be significant, however, incorrectly signed (Beine, 2004; Fatum, 2002;
Humpage, 1999; Catte et al., 1992). Nevertheless, the empirical literature has examined the
impact of coordinated interventions of a maximum of two central banks. In this research, we
3These results can be provided by the author upon request.
4These intervention data were obtained from the Federal Reserve, the Japanese Ministry of Finance, the
Bundesbank (ECB) and the HM treasury.
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provide additional results for coordinated interventions conducted by three central banks.
2.1 The DCC approach
The model employed in this paper is the Dynamic Conditional Correlation developed by Engle
(2002) which is defined as:
yt = µt(θ) + t, where t|Ωt−1 ∼ N(0, Ht) (2)
t = H
1/2
t ut, where ut ∼ N(0, I) (3)
Ht = DtRtDt (4)
where yt = (yit, ..., ynt)′ is a nx1 vector of exchange returns, specifically the DM(EUR), and
JPY returns against the USD, thus n = 2, µt(θ) = (µit, µnt)′ is the conditional nx1 mean vector
of yt, which can be specified as an ARMA process
Ψi(L)(yit − µit) = Θi(L)t (5)
µit = µi +
ni∑
j=1
δjiχj,t (6)
where L is the lag operator, Ψi(L) = 1 −∑nj=1 ψijLj and Θi(L) = 1 −∑nj=1 θijLj . Ht is the
conditional covariance matrix, Dt = diag(h
1/2
iit , ..., h
1/2
nnt)
′ is a diagonal matrix of square root
conditional variances, where hiit can be defined as any univariate GARCH-type model, and Rt
is the tx
(
n(n−1)
2
)
matrix containing the time-varying conditional correlations defined
Rt = diag(q
−1/2
11,t , ..., q
−1/2
nn,t )Qtdiag(q
−1/2
11,t , ..., q
−1/2
nn,t ) (7)
where Qt = (qij,t) is a nxn symmetric positive definite matrix given by:
Qt = (1− α− β)Q¯+ αut−1u′t−1 + βQt−1 (8)
where ut = (u1tu2t...unt)′ is the nx1 vector of standardized residuals, Q¯ is the nxn unconditional
variance matrix of ut, and α and β are nonnegative scalar parameters satisfying α+ β < 1.
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The DCC model is estimated using the Quasi-Maximum Likelihood (QML) estimator un-
der a multivariate Student distribution (see Harvey et al., 1992; Fiorentini et al., 2003). The
multivariate Student distribution is applied as it is well known that the normality assumption
of the innovations is rejected in most empirical applications dealing with daily exchange rate
data. This adds an extra parameter to the estimation of each model, namely the degrees of
freedom parameter, denoted by υ. When υ tends to infinity, the Student distribution tends to
the normal density. When it tends to zero, the tails of the density become thicker and thicker.
The parameter value indicates the order of existence of the moments, e.g. if υ = 2, the second
moments do not exist, but the first moments exist. For this reason it is convenient to assume
that υ > 2, so that the conditional variance-covariance matrix Ht is always interpretable as a
conditional covariance matrix.
2.2 The effect of CBI
In order to assess the impact of CBIs on exchange returns, volatility and correlations the DCC
model of Engle (2002) can be easily extended to incorporate exogenous variables as:
yt = µt(θ) + dtXt + t, where t|Ωt−1 ∼ N(0, Ht) (9)
t = H
1/2
t ut, where ut ∼ N(0, I) (10)
Ht = DtRtDt (11)
Where dt is the nx1 vector of parameters entering the mean equation and Xt is a nx1 vector of
exogenous variables that denote the set of central bank interventions at time t. The specification
for the proposed model has a different evolution for Qt that enters the Rt (the t ×
(
n(n−1)
2
)
matrix containing the time-varying conditional correlations), and the later enters the conditional
variance/covariance matrix Ht according to:
Qt = (1− α− β)Q¯+ αut−1u′t−1 + βQt−1 + δt−1Xt−1 (12)
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Where δt is the nx1 vector of parameters entering the conditional variance equation and Xt−1
is a nx1 vector of exogenous variables that denote the set of central bank interventions at time
t− 1.5 We focus on the impact of both unilateral and coordinated CBIs, on both the exchange
returns, variances and correlations. The following section presents these results for the various
definitions of the dummy variables.
3 Empirical results
In this section we begin by presenting the descriptive statistics of the data followed by the
empirical results of the CBI impact under the DCC specification.
3.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the mark(euro), and the yen returns series for the period
of April 2, 1991 to October 19, 2001. The returns are calculated by taking the first logarithmic
differences in exchange rates as denoted in equation (2.1). The means show the DM(EUR) and
JPY with small positive and negative returns, respectively. The daily unconditional standard
deviations of the JPY/USD return is greater than that for the DM exchange return, indicating
that volatility is greater in the JPY as opposed to the DM returns. The excess kurtosis parameter
estimate is significantly greater than zero for each returns series indicating non-normality of
returns. In addition, it is more than double than that for the JPY exchange rate, indicating that
extreme episodes (such as currency crises) are more than twice likely to occur in the JPY than
in the DM(EUR) market. In addition, the Jarque-Bera statistic confirms that exchange returns
are, as expected, not normally distributed since the null hypothesis of normally distributed
5More precisely, the dummy variables for CBIs equal to 1 when central bank(s) intervene in the purchase
or sale of US dollars and to 0 when no intervention occurs. See Table 1 for a specific definition of the dummy
variables used.
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returns is persuasively rejected and the data are clearly skewed.
[Insert Table 2 around here]
The Ljung-Box Q statistic tests the null hypothesis of no serial correlation and is calculated
using up to 10 lags for both daily returns and the squared returns series. A significant Q statistic
rejects the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in returns, while a significant Q statistic for
the squared returns series rejects the null hypothesis of homoskedastic squared returns. Table
2 reports the Q statistics to be significant at 10 lags across each returns series at the 5% level
of significance. This indicates that all exchange rates cannot be characterized as random walk
processes. The Q statistic in the squared returns is significant for each returns series indicating
strong non-linear dependencies. This is also supported by Engle’s ARCH-LM statistic. The last
row of Table 2 clearly shows the presence of ARCH effects in returns up to 5 lags. The null
hypothesis of no ARCH effects is rejected for each series at the 1% level of significance.
Figure 1, plots the exchange rates and returns series for the DM(EUR) and the JPY, all
against the USD. One can clearly observe the introduction of the Euro at the beginning of
1999.6 Focusing on the returns plots on the lower part of Figure 1, one can see the phenomenon
of volatility clustering, that is, large (small) changes tend to be followed by large (small) changes
of either sign.
[Insert Figure 1 around here]
The findings of higher order serial correlation, non-normality, non-linear dependency and
volatility clustering support the decision to model exchange rate volatility using a GARCH-type
process under the student-t distribution.
6The DM(EUR)/USD returns series on the bottom left panel in Figure 1 have been adjusted to account for
the introduction of the Euro in 1999.
9
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 3 present the number of days that CBIs were carried out under
the G4 assessment and under Beine’s (2004) G3 assessment (which serve as the base for our
comparisons), respectively. As previously mentioned, and as can be seen from Table 3, the
number of interventions for the variables in common among this research and Beine’s is different
due to the intervention definitions in this research.7
[Insert Table 3 around here]
Among the G4 Central Banks, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) was by far the most active, as
it intervened 176 times unilaterally in the JPY/USD market. The FED has conducted its
interventions unilaterally only in the DM(EUR)/USD market. In addition, the FED relied
solely on coordinated interventions with the BoJ in the JPY/USD market, whereas in the
DM(EUR)/USD market it intervened with the BoJ, the BB/ECB and/or the BoE since 1995.
The Bundesbank (BB) (or the European Central Bank, ECB, since 1999) has deployed its
interventions solely in the DM(EUR)/USD market. A very interesting feature of Table 5.4 is
the nature of the Bank of England’s (BoE) interventions. The BoE has intervened several times
7By definition, in this research, the classification of CBIs differs. For instance, when the dummy variable that
represents coordinated interventions conducted by 3 central banks in a currency and on a specific date is equal to
1, then instantaneously the dummy for coordinated interventions conducted by 2 central banks is equal to zero for
that specific intervention and date. In addition, the dummy variables that represent the unilateral interventions
for each of the 3 central banks are equal to zero on that date. For example, consider the sell of the DM/USD on
August 19th, 1991 by the BoJ, the BB and BoE. Under Beine’s (2004) framework and the rest of the papers that
examined CBIs under the G3 assessment (that is without the BoE assessment) the construction of the intervention
dummy variables for that date implies that these dummies are equal to zero for unilateral interventions by the
BoJ and the BB, and equal to 1 for coordinated interventions of 2 central banks. In my classification, the dummy
variables for unilateral intervention by the BoJ, the BB, the BoE and coordinated interventions of 2 central banks
are equal to zero. However, the dummy variable for coordinated intervention of 3 central banks equals to 1. That
is why in this classification there are fewer interventions regarding unilateral and coordinated interventions by 2
central banks.
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in coordination with at least one another central bank in both markets, and unilaterally once
in the JPY/USD market. Moreover, it has intervened six times in coordination with another
two Central Banks in the DM(EUR)/USD as shown in the last row of column 1 in Table 2.
The availability of official intervention data for the BoE motivates the examination of how the
impact of CBIs on exchange returns, volatility and correlation changes when the BoE is also
taken into account.
3.2 The DCC model performance
Table 4 presents the results of the DCC model performance described in Equation (2) - (4).
[Insert Table 4 around here]
The DCC model seems to perform very well in terms of capturing the DM(EUR) /USD
and the JPY/USD exchange rate dynamics: (1) Both exchange returns exhibit heteroskedastic-
ity, based on the significant estimated coefficients of the individual GARCH models. (2) The
conditional correlations of the DM(EUR)/USD and the JPY/USD returns are highly persistent
as shown by the significant parameter estimates of the DCC GARCH model. (3) The Li and
McLeod (1981) test (which is a multivariate version of the Box-Pierce/Ljung-Box portmanteau
test statistic for serial correlation) cannot reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation on
both standardized and squared standardized residuals, up to 20 lags. (4) The DCC model indi-
cates that the correlations between these two returns are indeed time-varying. This can also be
clearly seen in Figure 2, which plots the dynamic conditional correlation of the estimated DCC
model in Table 5.5. The correlations during April 2, 1991 to October 19, 2001 vary between
-0.05 to 0.8. Beginning from 1991, correlations between those two markets gradually declined
till 1994, then there was an increasing trend till the mid-1995 followed by a declining trend till
the end of 2000 when they became negative. Since the beginning of 2001, correlations varied
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around -0.05 to 0.2.
[Insert Figure 2 around here]
Having evaluated the good performance of the DCC model for the DM(EUR)/USD and
JPY/USD exchange returns dynamics, the results of the DCC, extended with exogenous vari-
ables to incorporate the impact of both unilateral and coordinated officially announced inter-
ventions will be presented in the following sections.
3.3 The impact of Coordinated Interventions
The analysis begins with the impact of coordinated interventions on exchange rate returns,
variances and correlations under the G4 assessment. These results are presented in Table 5.
Columns (a) and (b), (c) and (d), and (e) present the results for coordinated interventions of
2 central banks in the DM(EUR)/USD and the JPY/USD markets, of 3 central banks in the
DM(EUR)/USD market, and of 3 central banks in the DM(EUR)/USD market together with
the coordinated interventions of 2 central banks in the JPY/USD market, respectively.
[Insert Table 5 around here]
When coordinated interventions are conducted by only 2 central banks in the DM(EUR)/USD
and the JPY/USD markets, they have a significant impact only on the JPY volatility. How-
ever, no significant impact on exchange returns is evident. That is, coordinated interventions
do not affect the exchange rate returns, which in line with the empirical literature (e.g. see
Beine, 2004, and references therein). These results are presented in columns (a) and (b) in
Table 5. Under specification (a), the dummy variables for coordinated CBIs that enter in both
the mean and variance equations, attract significant coefficients only in the latter equation.
Specifically, coordinated interventions in the DM(EUR)/USD market significantly decrease the
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JPY volatility whereas, coordinated interventions in the JPY/USD market significantly increase
the JPY volatility. In addition, coordinated CBIs in the DM(EUR)/USD and the JPY/USD
markets do not have a significant impact on the DM(EURO) volatility. After dropping the
dummy variables for the coordinated CBIs on returns, as they were found insignificant, the new
specification under column (b) reports reduced impact of coordinated interventions on volatility.
Now, coordinated CBIs in the DM(EUR)/USD markets do not significantly decrease the JPY
volatility. The estimated parameter δCoDM is now significantly negative only at the 10% level.
The signs and significance of the rest of the parameter estimates remain similar to those under
specification (a). That is, when exactly two central banks intervene in coordination they can
significantly affect the volatility of returns, and in some cases in the correct direction. Under (a)
and (b) specifications, the Li and McLeod (1981) test reports no evidence of serial correlation
on both standardized and squared standardized residuals, up to 20 lags. These results under the
G4 assessment are partly in line with the empirical literature on the G3 assessment that shows
that coordinated interventions can significantly affect only volatility, but in a positive way (see
Beine, 2004; Beine et al., 2002; Bonser-Neal and Tanner, 1996, and references therein). We find
instances that coordinated interventions of two central banks under the G4 assessment in the
DM(EUR)/USD market to significantly decrease JPY volatility.
In addition, the existing literature suggests that coordinated interventions have a more sig-
nificant impact on volatility as opposed to unilateral ones Beine (2004); Fatum (2002); Humpage
(1999); Catte et al. (1992). The results recorded in the next section, which assesses the impact
of unilateral interventions under the DCC model, are in line with this finding. However, there
is no paper, to my knowledge, that examines the impact of a greater number of two central
banks intervening in coordination. If the previous argument is correct, then coordinated inter-
ventions of three central banks should increase even more the impact on exchange rate volatility
compared to interventions of one or two central banks.
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According to Table 3, the Bank of England (BoE) intervened six times in our investigation
sample in coordination with another two central banks in the DM(EUR)/USD market. Thus,
it would be of interest to see how our results change when three central banks coordinate their
interventions. Besides, apart from the FED, the BoJ and the BB/ECB, the BoE was among the
G6 that signed the Louvre Accord in 1987 (and which officially announces its interventions). As
previously mentioned, the aim of the Louvre Accord was to stabilize the turbulent international
currency markets. Hence, the post-Louvre period performance of the impact of a greater number
of central banks intervening in coordination on exchange rate dynamics is of great interest.
The results for coordinated interventions of three Central Banks in the DM/USD market
are presented under columns (c) and (d) in Table 5. Since there were not any coordinated
interventions conducted by three central banks in the JPY/USD market, we can only examine
the impact of coordinated interventions of three central banks in the DM(EUR)/USD market.
Under column (c) the dummies representing the coordinated interventions of three Central
Banks in the DM(EUR)/USD market enter both in the conditional mean and variance equations,
whereas under column (d) enter only in the conditional variance equation.
It is found, under column (c), that the impact of coordinated CBIs of three central banks is
dramatically different to the impact of coordinated interventions of two central banks. Specifi-
cally, coordinated interventions of three Central Banks in the DM/USD market do not have a
significant impact on exchange returns and volatilities. However, when the insignificant impact
of three Central Banks in the DM/USD in the conditional mean equation is removed, the re-
sults under column (d) show that coordinated interventions of three central banks significantly
increase the DM(EURO) volatility. The robustness of these results is strengthened even when
coordination of three Central Banks in the DM(EUR)/USD market are modeled together with
the coordination of two Central Banks in the JPY/USD market. These results are shown under
column (e) in Table 5. That is, the greater number of Banks engaging in coordinated interven-
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tions does not necessarily increase the effectiveness on volatility. On the contrary, when more
than two Central Banks intervene in coordination they can only increase exchange rate volatility.
The DCC model under the various specifications in Table 5 do not suffer from serial correlation
as the Li and McLeod (1981) test reports no evidence of serial correlation on both standardized
and squared standardized residuals up to 20 lags. Figure 3, which plots the dynamic conditional
correlations of the DCC model without exogenous variables (specification in Table 4), together
with the ones from the DCC with exogenous variables in the estimations (b) and (d) of Table 5,
shows that the magnitude of correlations is slightly intensified due to coordinated interventions.
[Insert Figure 3 around here]
These results could be of great importance for central banks’ decisions on conducting coor-
dinated interventions in a currency. According to these results if central banks wish to decrease
exchange rate volatility, then it is preferable to intervene in coordination with only one another
central bank and not in coordination with another two central banks; if it intervenes with an-
other two central banks it will only increase volatility. If a central bank wishes to affect its
exchange returns it should not intervene in coordination. Intervening in coordination with at
least another central bank will have no impact on exchange returns, as the vast majority of the
literature suggests (see Beine et al., 2009; Beine, 2004; Beine et al., 2002 and references therein).
These results are specific to our G4 assessment of official CBIs and evidently further research
is needed to determine whether and why the more coordination between central banks the less
effective the outcome on exchange returns and volatility is.
3.4 The impact of Unilateral Interventions
The empirical results of the impact of unilateral CBIs on exchange rate returns, variances and
correlations are presented in Table 6. Columns (a) and (b) present the results for the G3 and
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G4 unilateral CBIs, respectively.8
[Insert Table 6 around here]
The results of the DCC model extended with exogenous variables under columns (a) in Table
6 provide evidence that unilateral G3 interventions have little impact on both mean returns
and variances. Only CBIs conducted by the BoJ in the JPY/USD market significantly affect
both the JPY and DM(EUR) returns. Specifically, unilateral interventions of the BoJ cause a
depreciation of the US dollar. Unilateral interventions of the FED and the BB do not have a
significant impact on the two returns. These results partially contradict the empirical literature
that denotes unilateral interventions have no impact on returns (see Beine, 2004; Beine et al.,
2002; Bonser-Neal and Tanner, 1996, among others) as the BoJ interventions in the JPY/USD
market significantly affects the DM(EUR) and JPY returns.
Another interesting feature of column (a) in Table 6 is that unilateral interventions of the
BoJ and the BB(ECB), even though increase their own exchange rate volatility, albeit insignif-
icantly, have a significantly negative and positive externality impact on the JPY/USD and
the DM(EUR)/USD markets, respectively. That is, unilateral interventions of the BoJ in the
JPY/USD market significantly increase the DM(EUR) volatility and unilateral interventions
of the BB(ECB) in the DM(EUR)/USD market significantly reduce the JPY volatility. The
unilateral intervention impact of the FED on volatility of both returns is correctly negatively
signed but insignificant. These results are in line with the empirical literature that indicates
that unilateral interventions have a mixed effect on volatility (see Beine, 2004; Beine et al., 2002;
Bonser-Neal and Tanner, 1996).
8The dummy variables used in the evaluation of the impact of the G3 and G4 CBIs are based on those in
column 1 of Table 3. That is, these dummies are based on the definition of CBIs under the G4 assessment. In the
following section which involves robustness analysis we present the results of the impact of unilateral interventions
according to the dummies used in Beine’s (2004) paper under the G3 assessment.
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Including the BoE’s unilateral interventions under our G4 assessment, the results seem to
be more straighforward. Column (b) in Table 6, which presents these results, shows no evidence
of significant increase in volatility due to unilateral official CBIs, which is in line with central
banks’ intentions. That is, the impact of the BoJ intervention in the JPY/USD market on the
DM(EURO) volatility now becomes insignificantly positive and the BB(ECB) intervention in
the DM(EUR)/USD market on the DM(EURO) volatility is now correctly negatively signed,
although insignificant. The impact of interventions of the BoE in the JPY/USD market on both
returns’ volatility is also correctly signed, although insignificant.
In addition to the previous results, under column (a) in Table 6, of the impact of the G3 CBIs
on exchange returns (with the use of dummies under the G4 assessment), unilateral interven-
tions of the BoE significantly affect both DM/USD and JPY/USD returns, under column (b) in
Table 6. That is, taking into account the BoE, unilateral interventions have a significant effect
on returns and reduce volatility. These results contradict the empirical literature that finds that
unilateral interventions have no impact on returns (see Beine, 2004; Beine et al., 2002; Bonser-
Neal and Tanner, 1996). Moreover, the empirical literature, in most of cases, suggests that
unilateral interventions significantly increase volatility, indicating that the intervention should
be considered ineffective (see Beine 2004 and references therein). One major point of central
banks’ decisions to intervene is to decrease rather than increase exchange rate volatility. In this
research we provide evidence that unilateral interventions are effective (or to be more precise,
are productive), as their impact on mean returns is significant, and on volatility is correctly neg-
atively signed and significant in the case of the BB(ECB) interventions in the DM(EUR)/USD
market on the JPY volatility. No evidence that any of the unilateral interventions significantly
increases volatility is reported, which is in line with Central Banks’ intentions.
The conditional correlations of the DM(EUR) and JPY returns are highly persistent as
shown by the significant estimated a and b parameters of these two DCC models in Table 6
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indicating that correlation between these two returns are indeed time varying and driven by
unilateral CBIs. Figure 4, which plots the dynamic conditional correlations of the DCC without
exogenous variables (specification shown in Table 4), together with the ones from the DCC
with exogenous variables from (a) and (b) in 6 shows that unilateral interventions increase the
magnitude of correlations.
[Insert Figure 4 around here]
Last but not least, the DCC model is well specified as the Li and McLeod (1981) test reports
no evidence of serial correlation on both standardized and squared standardized residuals, as
it cannot reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation on both standardized and squared
standardized residuals, up to 20 lags.
3.5 Robustness Analysis
Having found evidence that unilateral interventions are more successful as opposed to coordi-
nated interventions of 2 or 3 central banks under the G4 assessment, since the former affect
returns and in minor cases reduce volatility, in this section several robustness checks are being
performed.
In order to check the robustness of the results of the impact of the officially announced
G4 unilateral and coordinated CBIs, dummy variables representing the impact of officially an-
nounced G3 CBIs were constructed. That is, we omitted the BoE’s interventions, and replicated
Beine’s (2004) analysis by using the same dates and variables but under the DCC framework.9
These results are presented in columns (a) and (b) on Table 7.
[Insert Table 7 around here]
9The dummy variables used for the G3 assessment were constructed based on the number of CBIs shown in
the last column of Table 3
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The results are almost identical to those of Beine (2004) obtained from the estimation of
the VECH model for the equivalent parameters. That is, officially announced G3 unilateral and
coordinated interventions affect exchange rate volatility and have no impact on returns. These
results again justify the robustness of the results obtained under the G4 assessment through the
DCC framework.
Another point of interest is to examine whether specific central banks, where that their
unilateral interventions were found to be ”effective”, could still be effective when conducted in
coordination with another specific central bank. As it was shown that the Bundesbank’s (or
ECB’s after 1999) interventions in the DM(EUR)/USD market reduce volatility, it is of interest
to check whether the Bundesbank (ECB) intervening together with at least another central bank
decreased exchange rate volatility. The Bundesbank (ECB) intervened in coordination with at
least another central bank in the DM(EUR)/USD market fifteen times. This specific choice of
central banks intervening in coordination might shed light on the counterproductive evidence of
coordinated interventions. Table 8 presents the empirical results for coordinated CBIs wherein
the BB(ECB) is involved.
[Insert Table 8 around here]
As can be clearly seen, coordinated interventions involving the BB(ECB) neither signifi-
cantly affect exchange returns nor volatility. Hence, even when a central bank, whose unilateral
interventions are found to be successful, intervenes in coordination with another central bank,
its impact on exchange returns and volatility diminishes.10 This is in line with the empirical
literature and which strengthens our previous results that coordinated CBIs are counterproduc-
tive. Clearly, further investigation needs to be done in order to find out why interventions are
10Other combinations of coordinated CBIs were investigated and the results were of the same qualitative nature.
These results can be obtained from the author upon request.
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so counterproductive when conducted in coordination.
Another interesting feature is to assess whether there exist any asymmetries, that is to
investigate whether the purchase of US dollars has a different impact than the sale of US dollars
in the foreign exchange markets. One would expect that the purchase (sale) of US dollars to be
associated with a US dollar appreciation (depreciation). In addition, if successful, CBIs should
significantly decrease volatility.
In order to assess whether any asymmetries exist whenever a CBI takes place, two sets of
dummy variables were constructed. The one set of dummies involves dummies that are equal
to one when a central bank purchases US dollars and zero otherwise, and the other set involves
dummies that are equal to one when a central bank sells US dollars and zero otherwise. The
number of purchases and sales of US dollars by each central bank are presented in Table 9. The
BoJ again is once more the most active central bank with 149 purchases and 27 sales of US
dollars during our data sample.
[Insert Table 9 around here]
The estimation results for the purchase and sale of USD are presented in Table 10 and 11,
respectively. According to Table 10, coordinated purchases of US dollars do not significantly
affect returns. Even though they are correctly positively signed (appreciation of the US dollar)
when conducted on the DM(EUR)/USD market, they are found to be insignificant. In addition,
coordinated purchases of USD in general increase volatility, the greater the number of central
banks involved. In the case of unilateral CBIs, purchases of USD are associated with a significant
appreciation of the US dollar and decreased volatility when interventions are conducted by
the BoJ.11 That is, unilateral purchases of US dollars are found to be more productive than
11Unilateral FED interventions are also found to cause an appreciation of the US dollar however, the estimated
parameters are insignificant.
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coordinated ones in terms of their effect on returns, as they are associated with the intended
appreciation of the US dollar.
[Insert Table 10 around here]
In the case of sales of US dollars the results remain almost the same. These results are pre-
sented in Table 11. Coordinated sales of USD conducted by two central banks do not significantly
affect returns and can only significantly decrease volatility in the JPY/USD (when conducted on
the DM(EUR)/USD market). However, when coordinated sales of USD are conducted by three
central banks, they still do not have a significant impact on returns but significantly increase
volatility. In the case of unilateral interventions the estimated parameters accounting for sales
of USD are correctly associated with a depreciation of the US dollar (negatively signed), and are
significant when conducted by the BoJ and BoE. In the case of the impact on unilateral sales
of US dollars on exchange rate volatility, one can see that, each of the unilateral interventions
is associated with decreased volatility (as the estimated parameters are negatively signed), but
are significant only when conducted by the BoJ.
[Insert Table 11 around here]
In conclusion, even when asymmetries are taken into account the results remain the same
as those obtained from our main analysis, which strengthens our results. That is, the more
coordination of central banks in the foreign exchange markets, the more counterproductive
their impact on returns and volatility. Specifically, unilateral purchases and sales of US dollars
affect returns in the intended direction and can significantly reduce exchange rate volatility only
when conducted by the BoJ; however, coordinated interventions conducted by two central banks
and, especially by three central banks, do not have the intended outcome on both returns and
volatility.
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4 Conclusion
In order to shed some light on the effectiveness of official CBIs, this paper examined the signalling
channel through which official CBIs, conducted unilaterally or in coordination with two and
three central banks, could affect exchange returns, their volatility and correlations. A novel
contribution of this study is the assessment of the impact of the G4 CBIs on exchange returns,
volatility and correlations. Specifically, in addition to the G3 CBIs impact of the Federal Reserve
(FED), Bank of Japan (BoJ) and the Bundesbank [or European Central Bank (BB/ECB),
after 1999] on the DM(EUR)/USD and the JPY/USD markets, that has been systematically
examined in the literature, this paper provided contributory results on the G4 interventions by
adding the Bank of England (BoE). This investigation was extended with the application of the
DCC model of Engle (2002) that recently has used when modeling exchange returns dynamics
because of its flexible structure and the specification of time-varying conditional correlations.
This is another contribution of this paper, as the DCC has never been employed before to study
the impact of CBIs on exchange rate dynamics. The DCC model performed very well in the
various specifications and showed that CBIs intensify the DM(EUR)/USD and the JPY/USD
dynamic conditional correlations.
Under the G4 assessment, it was found that official CBIs can significantly affect exchange
returns only when these are conducted unilaterally. In the case of the impact of CBIs on
volatility, it was found that unilateral interventions, in some cases, decrease volatility. However,
coordinated interventions are more counterproductive the greater the number of central banks
intervening in coordination.
The results of the impact of the G4 CBIs under the DCC assessment are strengthened by
various robustness checks, such as re-examining the established G3 assessment, accounting for
coordinated interventions by specific central banks that were found to be successful unilaterally,
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and accounting for asymmetries.
Based on our results, unilateral CBIs can influence returns in the intended direction, whereas
coordinated CBIs do not have a significant impact on returns. In terms of the impact of CBIs on
exchange rate volatility the results are as follows. Unilateral or even coordinated interventions
of 2 central banks can, in minor cases, significantly decrease volatility. However, coordinated
interventions of 3 central banks in the same currency can only increase volatility, which is the
exact opposite of the central banks’ intentions. These results have important implications for
the effectiveness of Central Banks’ intervention policy decisions. That is, if central banks wish to
influence exchange rates and/or volatility, they should intervene unilaterally. The more central
banks intervene in coordination the less, or the opposite from the, anticipated would be the
generated outcome.
Moreover, CBIs in one market are found to positively affect correlations between foreign
exchange markets. That is, CBIs conducted either unilaterally or in coordination in one market
intensify volatility in other foreign exchange markets. This is true in a world of highly integrated
financial markets and might be the reason why these CBIs, and especially coordinated ones,
increase volatility in these markets in most of the cases.
A limitation of the results obtained in this paper is captured by the following question: had
not central banks intervened, would the impact on returns and volatility have been different?
This is a rather difficult question to address. Nonetheless, a recent growing literature has focused
on the impact of official statements and speeches of central banks on foreign exchange markets
prior to intervention (see, for instance Beine et al., 2009, and references therein)(see, for instance,
Beine, Janssen and Lecourt, 2009, and references therein). Using this approach, our analysis
could be extended to answer the above question.
In addition, the analysis in this paper was solely based on the investigation of the signalling
channel through which CBIs could affect exchange returns, volatility and correlations using daily
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data under the DCC model. That is, the portfolio-balance channel was not examined. Hence,
it would be of interest in further research to investigate how the impact of the G4 CBIs, in the
context of the portfolio-balance model, changes.
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Table 1: Definition of exogenous-dummy variables
Variable Definition
Exogenous variables in the conditional mean equation
dFEDdm(eur) Unilateral interventions of the FED on the DM(EUR)/USD market.
dBOJjpy Unilateral interventions of the BoJ on the JPY/USD market.
dBBdm(eur) Unilateral interventions of the BB(ECB) on the DM(EUR)/USD market.
dBoEjpy Unilateral interventions of the BoE on the JPY/USD market.
dCoDM(EUR) Coordinated interventions of 2 central Banks on the DM(EUR)/USD market.
dCoDM(EUR)3 Coordinated interventions of 3 central Banks on the DM(EUR)/USD market.
dCoJPY Coordinated interventions of 2 central Banks on the JPY/USD market.
Exogenous variables in the conditional variance equation
δFEDdm(eur) Unilateral interventions of the FED on the DM(EUR)/USD market.
δBOJjpy Unilateral interventions of the BoJ on the JPY/USD market.
δBBdm(eur) Unilateral interventions of the BB(ECB) on the DM(EUR)/USD market.
δBoEjpy Unilateral interventions of the BoE on the JPY/USD market.
δCoDM(EUR) Coordinated interventions of 2 central Banks on the DM(EUR)/USD market.
δCoDM(EUR)3 Coordinated interventions of 3 central Banks on the DM(EUR)/USD market.
δCoJPY Coordinated interventions of 2 central Banks on the JPY/USD market.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of returns. 02.04.1991 - 19.10.2001
DM(EUR) JPY
Mean 0.0001 -0.0001
Standard Deviation 0.0068 0.0073
Skewness -0.1294 [0.01]** -0.7031 [0.00]**
Excess Kurtosis 2.1193 [0.00]** 5.7496 [0.00]**
Normality Test (JB) 507.11 [0.00]** 3897.6 [0.00]**
Q(10) 18.885 [0.04]* 20.746 [0.02]*
Q2(10) 143.94 [0.00]** 288.63 [0.00]**
ARCH(5) 12.590 [0.00]** 27.489 [0.00]**
Notes: [] denote p-values. Q(10) and Q2(10) is the Ljung-Box statistic for serial correlation in raw series and
squared series, respectively. JB refers to the Jarque-Bera test. * 5% significant; ** 1% significant.
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Table 3: Central Bank Interventions: 02.04.1991 - 19.10.2001
Beine (2004)
G4 assessment G3 assessment
JPY/USD Number of interventions
Unilateral FED 0 1
Unilateral BoJ 176 180
Unilateral BoE 1 -
Coordinated interventions of 22 19
2 Central Banks
DM(EUR)/USD
Unilateral FED 7 12
Unilateral BoJ 0 0
Unilateral BB/ECB 5 6
Unilateral BoE 0 -
Coordinated interventions of 10 12
2 Central Banks
Coordinated interventions of 6 -
3 Central Banks
Notes: The last column is taken from Table 2 of Beine (2004).
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Table 4: DCC Model of DM(EUR) and JPY returns. 02.04.1991 - 19.10.2001
Dependent Variables Explanatory Variables
Conditional Mean DM(EUR) Constant 0.0002 (1.99)*
JPY Constant 0.0243 (2.41)*
Conditional Variance DM(EUR) Constant 1.2e-07 (2.10)*
α DM(EUR) 0.0351 (5.74)**
β DM(EUR) 0.9596 (131.4)**
JPY Constant 0.0035 (2.70)**
α JPY 0.0416 (6.73)**
β JPY 0.9517 (135.5)**
DCC α 0.0132 (261.1)**
DCC β 0.9847 (967.3)**
υ 5.7691 (13.19)**
Log Lik. 7454.59
Standardized Residuals Based Tests
Q(20) 79.964 [0.45]
Q2(20) 87.440 [0.20]
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis. * and ** denote 5% and 1% significance, respectively.
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Table 5: Coordinated CBIs: Signalling Channel analysis of DM(EUR) & JPY. 1991-2001
Dependent Var. Explanatory Var. (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Condit. Mean DM(EUR) Constant 0.0002 (2.30)* 0.0002 (2.30)* 0.0002 (2.12)* 0.0002 (2.13)* 0.0002 (2.07)*
dCoDM(EUR) 0.0015 (0.49)
dCoDM(EUR)3 0.0059 (1.62)
dCoJPY 3e-05 (0.02)
JPY Constant 0.0229 (2.33)* 0.0231 (2.24)* 0.0248 (2.51)* 0.0247 (2.36)* 0.0240
dCoDM(EUR) 0.1858 (0.77)
dCoDM(EUR)3 0.1194 (0.64)
dCoJPY -0.0019 (-0.01)
Condit. Var. DM(EUR) Constant 3.4e-07 (2.26)* 3.4e-07 (2.09)* 3.2e-07 (2.29)* 3.3e-07 (2.48)* 3.3e-07 (2.23)*
δCoDM(EUR) 7.2e-06 (0.90) 7.4e-06 (0.88)
δCoDM(EUR)3 2.1e-05 (1.57) 2e-05 (2.14)* 2.4e-05 (1.76)
δCoJPY -3.3e-07 (-0.09) -2.1e-07 (-0.06) 2.3e-06 (0.63)
α DM(EUR) 0.0352 (5.78)** 0.0348 (5.72)** 0.0326 (5.78)** 0.0330 (5.17)** 0.0332 (5.19)**
β DM(EUR) 0.9589 (135)** 0.9592 (130)** 0.9612 (140)** 0.9605 (133)** 0.9600 (126)**
JPY Constant 0.0036 (2.34)* 0.0037 (2.49)* 0.0037 (2.34)* 0.0037 (2.49)* 0.0039 (2.25)*
δCoDM(EUR) -0.0690 (-3.05)** -0.0736 (-1.73)
δCoDM(EUR)3 0.0123 (0.28) 0.0181 (0.51) 0.0231 (0.58)
δCoJPY 0.1082 (2.31)* 0.1123 (2.37)* 0.0950 (1.98)*
α JPY 0.0394 (5.66)** 0.0396 (6.30)** 0.0420 (6.30)** 0.0420 (6.08)** 0.0407 (6.19)**
β JPY 0.9522 (112)** 0.9519 (126)** 0.9506 (121)** 0.9506 (123)** 0.9497 (115)**
DCC α 0.0190 (4.99)** 0.0192 (4.93)** 0.0182 (4.91)** 0.0183 (4.91)** 0.0192 (5.01)**
DCC β 0.9789 (229)** 0.9787 (227)** 0.9798 (233)** 0.9796 (232)** 0.9789 (225)**
υ 5.8473 (14.06)** 5.8471 (13.29)** 5.8535 (12.85)** 5.8766 (13.29)** 5.9604 (13.36)**
Log. Lik. 7461.2 7460.6 7460.1 7458.9 7461.6
Standardized Residuals Based Tests
Q(20) 78.62 [0.49] 78.73 [0.49] 77.76 [0.52] 76.26 [0.57] 75.75 [0.58]
Q2(20) 87.28 [0.20] 86.35 [0.22] 93.55 [0.10] 97.12 [0.06] 92.56 [0.11]
Note: Parenthesis and brackets are the t-statistics and p-values, respectively. * and ** denote 5% and 1%
significance, respectively. See Table 1 for definitions of the exogenous (dummy) variables.
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Table 6: Unilateral CBIs: Signalling Channel analysis of DM(EUR) & JPY. 1991-2001
Dependent Explanatory (a) (b)
Variables Variables
Conditional Mean Constant 0.0003 (2.96)** 0.0003 (2.70)**
DM(EUR) dFEDdm(eur) -0.0013 (-0.56) -0.0013 (-0.59)
dBoJjpy -0.0011 (-2.88)** -0.0011 (-2.48)*
dBBdm(eur) 0.0051 (1.79) 0.0051 (1.54)
dBoEjpy 0.0319 (6.29)**
JPY Constant 0.0310 (3.39)** 0.0310 (3.27)**
dFEDdm(eur) -0.2092 (-1.01) -0.2081 (-1.28)
dBoJjpy -0.1394 (-3.91)** -0.1392 (-3.23)**
dBBdm(eur) 0.0064 (0.05) 0.0074 (0.05)
dBoEjpy 0.7673 (3.11)**
Conditional Variance Constant 1e-05 (40.6)** 3E-07 (2.15)*
DM(EUR) δFEDdm(eur) -4e-06 (-0.77) -4e-06 (-0.67)
δBoJjpy 1e-06 (2.15)* 1e-06 (1.60)
δBBdm(eur) 1e-06 (0.14) -1e-06 (-0.11)
δBoEjpy -2.2e-06 (-0.08)
α DM(EUR) 0.0344 (8.16)** 0.0344 (5.70)**
β DM(EUR) 0.9583 (252)** 0.9589 (129)**
JPY Constant 0.0036 (2.69)* 0.0037 (2.24)*
δFEDdm(eur) -0.0020 (-0.04) -0.0033 (-0.05)
δBoJjpy 0.0020 (0.37) 0.0020 (0.28)
δBBdm(eur) -0.0850 (-4.76)** -0.0854 (-3.58)**
δBoEjpy -0.0281 (-0.34)
α JPY 0.0393 (6.71)** 0.0394 (5.93)**
β JPY 0.9537 (136)** 0.9534 (117)**
DCC α 0.0187 (7.21)** 0.0184 (4.58)**
DCC β 0.9790 (327)** 0.9793 (213)**
υ 5.7413 (14.11)** 5.7555 (22.87)**
Log Lik. 7467.5 7474.8
Standardized Residuals Based Tests
Q(20) 78.4882 [0.50] 78.2778 [0.50]
Q2(20) 84.8886 [0.25] 86.3596 [0.22]
Note: Parenthesis and brackets are the t-statistics and p-values, respectively. * and ** denote 5% and 1%
significance, respectively. See Table 1 for definitions of the exogenous (dummy) variables.
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Table 7: Replication of Beine (2004) estimations under the G3 impact through the DCC model
Coordinated Interventions Unilateral Interventions
Dependent Explanatory (a) (b) (c) (d)
Variables Variables
Conditional Mean Constant 0.0002 (2.21)* 0.0002 (2.35)*
DM(EUR) dCoDM(EUR) 0.0035 (1.44)
dCoJPY -0.0001 (-0.07)
dFEDdm(eur) 0.0003 (0.17)
dBBdm(eur) 0.0050 (1.76)
JPY Constant 0.0236 (2.48)* 0.0239 (2.49)*
dCoDM(EUR) 0.1451 (0.90)
dCoJPY 0.0333 (0.17)
dBoJjpy -0.0655 (-1.73)
dBoJdm(eur) 0.0280 (0.00)
Conditional Variance Constant 4e-07 (2.01)* 4e-07 (2.39)* 4e-07 (2.48)* 4e-07 (41.84)**
DM(EUR) δCoDM(EUR) 1e-05 (1.82) 2e-05 (2.06)*
δCoJPY -1e-06 (-0.18) -1e-06 (-0.15)
δFEDdm(eur) -4e-06 (-0.83) -4e-06 (-0.82)
δBoJjpy 1e-06 (1.69) 1e-06 (2.14)*
δBBdm(eur) 1e-06 (0.15) 3e-06 (0.27)
αDM(EUR) 0.0334 (5.37)** 0.0330 (5.29)** 0.0344 (6.10)** 0.0341 (26.79)**
βDM(EUR) 0.9588 (116)** 0.9592 (127)** 0.9579 (137)** 0.9585 (866)**
JPY Constant 0.0042 (2.35)* 0.0042 (2.51)* 0.0036 (2.91)** 0.0037 (8.28)**
δCoDM(EUR) -0.0123 (-0.50) -0.0090 (-0.32)
δCoJPY 0.1009 (1.98)* 0.1021 (1.99)*
δFEDdm(eur) -0.0019 (-0.0357) -0.0032 (-0.0651)
δBoJjpy 0.0022 (0.3555) 0.0022 (0.4500)
δBBdm(eur) -0.0825 (-3.8711)** -0.0842 (-3.8631)**
αJPY 0.0404 (5.9160)** 0.0406 (5.7592)** 0.0392 (7.1439)** 0.0400 (30.6338)**
βJPY 0.9496 (112.1868)** 0.9495 (107.9598)** 0.9539 (148.3135)** 0.9528 (831.0234)**
DCC α 0.0190 (4.4552)** 0.0196 (4.8976)** 0.0183 (4.8422)** 0.0184 (19.1672)**
DCC β 0.9791 (209.2930)** 0.9784 (215.6425)** 0.9795 (227.6701)** 0.9793 (873.6994)**
υ 6.0272 (12.8189)** 5.9500 (13.0542)** 5.8488 (14.5558)** 5.7838 (17.7490)**
Log Lik. 7460.2167 7462.4958 7460.6221 7461.1064
Standardized Residuals Based Tests
Q(20) 77.8420 [0.5157] 76.0561 [0.5730] 78.6535 [0.4898] 79.4615 [0.4643]
Q2(20) 88.8644 [0.1675] 92.9871 [0.1036] 83.1936 [0.29470] 86.4296 [0.2165]
Note: Parenthesis and brackets are the t-statistics and p-values, respectively. * and ** denote 5% and 1%
significance, respectively. See Table 1 for definitions of the exogenous (dummy) variables.
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Table 8: Coordinated CBIs of BB(ECB) with at least another CB
Dependent Variables Explanatory Variables Coordinated Interventions
Conditional Mean DM(EUR) Constant 0.0002 (2.247)*
dCoDM(EUR) 0.0034 (1.525)
JPY Constant 0.0241 (2.545)*
dCoDM(EUR) 0.1340 (1.077)
Conditional Variance DM(EUR) Constant 3.62e-07 (2.637)*
δCoDM(EUR) 1e-05 (1.801)
αDM(EUR) 0.0330 (5.566)**
βDM(EUR) 0.9593 (139.1)**
JPY Constant 0.0038 (2.530)*
δCoDM(EUR) -0.0052 (-0.189)
αJPY 0.0427 (6.566)**
βJPY 0.9501 (119.6)**
DCC α 0.0185 (5.221)**
DCC β 0.9794 (241.96)**
υ 5.8490 (13.90)**
Log Lik. 7459.8
Standardized Residuals Based Tests
Q(20) 78.32 [0.500]
Q2(20) 93.82 [0.093]
Note: Parenthesis and brackets are the t-statistics and p-values, respectively. * and ** denote 5% and 1%
significance, respectively. See Table 1 for definitions of the exogenous (dummy) variables.
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Table 9: Purchase and sale of USD. 1991-2001
Purchase of USD Sale of USD
JPY/USD Number of Interventions
Unilateral FED 0 0
Unilateral BoJ 149 27
Unilateral BoE 0 1
Coordinated Interventions
of 2 Central Banks 18 4
DM(EUR)/USD
Unilateral FED 6 2
Unilateral BoJ 0 0
Unilateral BB/ECB 0 0
Unilateral BoE 0 0
Coordinated Interventions
of 2 Central Banks 6 4
Coordinated Interventions
of 3 Central Banks 5 2
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Table 10: The impact of purchase of USD. 1991-2001
Coordinated Interventions Unilateral Interventions
Dependent Explanatory (a) (b) (c)
Variables Variables
Conditional Mean Constant 0.0002 (2.329)* 0.0002 (2.164) 0.0003 (2.783)
DM(EUR) dCoDM(EUR) 0.010 (2.412)*
dCoDM(EUR)3 0.0020 (0.500)
dCoJPY -0.0014 (-0.642)
dFEDdm(eur) -0.0028 (-1.535)
dBoJjpy -0.0012 (-2.765)**
(JPY) Constant 0.0235 (2.514)* 0.0249 (2.471)* 0.0307 (3.188)**
dCoDM(EUR) 1.0028 (2.236)*
dCoDM(EUR)3 0.0242 (0.115)
dCoJPY -0.0915 (-0.364)
dFEDdm(eur) -0.2953 (-1.909)
dBoJjpy -0.1740 (-3.923)**
Conditional Variance Constant 3e-07 (2.156)* 3e-07 (2.328)* 3e-07 (40.11)**
DM(EUR) δCoDM(EUR) 5e-06 (0.402)
δCoDM(EUR)3 2e-05 (1.818)
δCoJPY 1e-06 (0.195)
δFEDdm(eur) -4e-06 (-0.653)
δBoJjpy 1e-06 (1.895)
αDM(EUR) 0.0374 (5.755)** 0.0322 (5.731)** 0.0362 (25.95)**
βDM(EUR) 0.9572 (123.9)** 0.9620 (143.6)** 0.9573 (792.2)**
(JPY) Constant 0.0035 (2.369)* 0.0036 (2.427)* 0.0034 (7.056)**
δCoDM(EUR) 0.0265 (0.159)
δCoDM(EUR)3 0.0261 (0.653)**
δCoJPY 0.0913 (1.221)
δFEDdm(eur) -0.0163 (-0.336)
δBoJjpy 0.0101 (1.711)
αJPY 0.0406 (5.656)** 0.0420 (6.597)** 0.0404 (27.77)**
βJPY 0.9511 (114.9)** 0.9508 (127.1)** 0.9519 (741.6)**
DCC α 0.0185 (5.125)** 0.0182 (4.552)** 0.0194 (16.99)**
DCC β 0.9794 (242.7)** 0.9797 (221.9)** 0.9782 (729.3)**
υ 5.8222 (13.79)** 5.8404 (14.36)** 5.7099 (17.51)**
Log Lik. 7462.1 7458.9 7463.5
Standardized Residuals Based Tests
Q(20) 77.48 [0.527] 76.99 [0.543] 79.97 [0.448]
Q2(20) 86.48 [0.215] 93.95 [0.092] 83.05 [0.299]
Note: Parenthesis and brackets are the t-statistics and p-values, respectively. * and ** denote 5% and 1%
significance, respectively. See Table 1 for definitions of the exogenous (dummy) variables.
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Table 11: The impact of sale of USD. 1991-2001
Coordinated Interventions Unilateral Interventions
Dependent Explanatory (a) (b) (c) (d)
Variables Variables
Conditional Mean Constant 0.0002 (2.398)* 0.0002 (2.206)* 0.0002 (2.456)* 0.0002 (2.390)*
DM(EUR) dCoDM(EUR) -0.0110 (-2.469)*
dCoDM(EUR)3 0.0184 (1.509)
dCoJPY -0.0015 (-0.394)
dFEDdm(eur) 0.0012 (0.135) 0.0022 (0.161)
dBoJjpy -0.0010 (-0.813) -0.0010 (-1.068)
dBoEjpy 0.0319 (6.268)**
(JPY) Constant 0.0240 (2.641)** 0.0238 (2.288)* 0.0241 (2.564)* 0.0238 (2.440)*
dCoDM(EUR) -0.5942 (-2.534)*
dCoDM(EUR)3 0.4858 (1.267)
dCoJPY -0.3346 (-1.173)
dFEDdm(eur) 0.4054 (0.907) 0.4122 (0.960)
dBoJjpy -0.0296 (-0.343) -0.0300 (-0.394)
dBoEjpy 0.7744 (3.434)
Conditional Variance Constant 4e-07 (2.489)* 3e-07 (2.171)* 3e-07 (2.354)* 3e-07 (2.229)*
DM(EUR) δCoDM(EUR) 8e-05 (0.581)
δCoDM(EUR)3 1e-05 (0.563)
δCoJPY -1e-05 (-1.160)
δFEDdm(eur) 1e-05 (0.533) 1e-05 (0.454)
δBoJjpy -1e-07 (-0.083) -1e-07 (-0.096)
dBoEjpy -1e-05 (-0.338)
αDM(EUR) 0.0352 (5.863)** 0.0336 (5.495)** 0.0353 (6.143)** 0.0349 (5.822)**
βDM(EUR) 0.9588 (132.1)** 0.9600 (121.8)** 0.9590 (140.2)** 0.9597 (132.7)**
(JPY) Constant 0.0033 (3.229)** 0.0040 (2.436)* 0.0039 (2.971)** 0.0042 (2.830)**
δCoDM(EUR) -0.1096 (-3.1131)**
δCoDM(EUR)3 -0.0645 (-0.879)
δCoJPY -0.0355 (-0.550)
δFEDdm(eur) -0.1011 (-1.197) -0.1054 (-1.261)
δBoJjpy -0.0205 (-2.564)* -0.0212 (-2.404)*
dBoEjpy -0.0991 (-1.393)
αJPY 0.0391 (7.566)** 0.0412 (5.998)** 0.0395 (6.781)** 0.0392 (6.079)**
βJPY 0.9549 (181.9)** 0.9509 (116.0)** 0.9536 (141.0)** 0.9533 (128.1)**
DCC α 0.0177 (4.710)** 0.0110 (29615)** 0.0181 (5.540)** 0.0178 (4.452)**
DCC β 0.9801 (231.7)** 0.9873 (1173)** 0.9797 (263.8)** 0.9801 (212.5)**
υ 5.7890 (14.11)** 5.8096 (13.75)** 5.7727 (14.72)** 5.7865 (13.80)**
Log Lik. 7461.7 7454.1 7459.4 7467.1
Standardized Residuals Based Tests
Q(20) 77.57 [0.524] 80.29 [0.438] 80.63 [0.428] 80.62 [0.428]
Q2(20) 89.10 [0.163] 78.76 [0.423] 89.04 [0.164] 88.94 [0.166]
Note: Parenthesis and brackets are the t-statistics and p-values, respectively. * and ** denote 5% and 1%
significance, respectively. See Table 1 for definitions of the exogenous (dummy) variables.
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Figure 1: Plots of Exchange Rates and Returns series. 02.04.1991 - 19.10.2001
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Figure 2: Conditional Correlations of the DM(EUR)/USD and the JPY/USD Returns
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Figure 3: Dynamic Conditional Correlations of the DM(EUR)/USD and the JPY/USD Returns,
including the ones from estimations (b) and (d) from Table 5
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8 rDMJPY 
rDMJPY(d)Coord 
rDMJPY(b)Coord 
 
39
Figure 4: Dynamic Conditional Correlations of the DM(EUR)/USD and the JPY/USD Returns,
including the ones from estimations (a) and (b) from Table 6
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